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In this paper, we consider the problem of ranking protiles of opportunity sets. First, we take each 
agent's preferences over (individual) opportunity sets as given. Then, rather than discriminate 
among possibly competing evaluative criteria, we consider minimal standards for any such 
ranking. We impose four normative principies, in each case limiting the conditions under which 
ethical conclusions might be drawn to only those cases that are unambiguous. The first three 
principies are subrestrictions of the Pareto criterion; they require that Pareto improvements 
unambiguously enhance social welfare only when they do not conflict with other social objectives. 
The fourth principie is a minimal equity condition. It requires that if an agent can be identified 
as being the worst-off, then a necessary condition for social welfare to unambiguously increase 
when sorne agents gain is that this agent gains as well, however slightly. We then study the 
properties of social optima under these restrictions. We show that while optima need not be Pareto 
efficient, they must be envy-free. Thus, accepting these principies requires commitment to a world 
in which no agent envies the opportunities available to another. 
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l. Introduction 
Clearly, there is a: great deal of controversy over the appropriate criteria 
for evaluating or ranking social outcomes or states. And when confronted with 
incompatible or inconsistent criteria, one is generally forced to select among 
them. Here we pursue a different course. Rather than argue for or against one 
criterion or another, we accept the plurality of such views, and we attempt to 
find common ground. That is, we propose to consider minimal standards for 
ranking social states - a common denominator of sorts. 
We cast our discussion in terms of the opportunities available to the 
members of society. Thus, a social state is described by a list of sets of the 
1 n 1 1form 0=(0 , ... ,O ), where O denotes the opportunities available to agent i. 
(As will be seen in the sequel, this generalizes the standard economic 
formulation in which a state corresponds to a resource allocation.) We wish to 
consider necessary conditions for ranking distributions of opportunity sets. 
First. as in standard (economic) choice environments, we do not enquire of 
the source of preferences but simply take them as given. Here, however, we 
2begin with preferences defined over sets. Thus, any intrinsic value afforded 
by alternative decision environments is incorporated into the agents' primitive 
lThe first attempts to rank distributions of opportunity sets in the manner 
described here were in Kranich 0993a, bl. The relationship between the present 
study and those is discussed in Section 7 below. See also Thomson (994) for a 
discussion of equitable opportunities. 
2There is by now a substantial literature on extending a (preference) relation 
defined on a set to the power seto [See Fishburn (993) and Nehring and Puppe 
(994) for recent examples and the references cited therein.l This approach 
presumes that agents' basic preferences are defined over the individual members 
of the seto However, there is no fundamental reason to presume that such 
preferences depend only on singletons. 
1 
.. 3descnptlOns. 
We then posit four normative principIes which we consider necessary for a 
well-behaved social ordering. In each case, we limit the conditions under 
which ethical conclusions might be drawn to only those cases that are 
4b . unam 19UOUS. 
According to the Principle of Just Enhancement, if an agent can be 
identified as being the worst-off, then, ceteris paribus, a rank-preserving 
enhancement of his or her opportunity set should result in an unambiguous 
social improvement. Next, the Principle of Transposition states that if two 
agents each prefer the opportunity set of the other, then transposing their 
sets should unambiguously improve social welfare. The Restricted Pareto 
Principle is a weak form of the Pareto criterion; it requires that at least 
those Pareto improvements in which each agent prefers his or her own 
opportunity set should be welfare enhancing. Otherwise, however, Pareto 
improvements might conflict with other distributional objectives, in which case 
the effect on social welfare may be ambiguous. Finally, we propose the 
Principle of Just Distribution which again applies only in the event an agent 
can be identified as being the worst-off, and it requires that in order for 
social welfare to unambiguously increase when sorne ("wealthier") agents gain, 
then it is necessary that the opportunities available to the worst-off agent 
3See Sen 0991,1992) for a discussion of the distinction between intrinsic 
versus instrumental dimensions of choice. 
4The interpretation is critical. There may be circumstances which nearly 
everyone agrees are social welfare enhancing. However, if one person 
disagrees, then we would say the change is "ambiguous." In such circumstances, 
social welfare may increase or it may noto Indeed, in terms of "unambiguous" 
changes, the alternative states may be incomparable. Our objective is to 
describe conditions under which social welfare comparisons are unambiguous, 
that is, under which we would all agree. 
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should improve as well, however minimally. Thus, for example, the "poorest" 
agent should share in the benefits of an increase in aggregate 
., 5,6,7
opport umtles. 
While these principIes are insufficient to ensure a complete ranking of 
distributions of opportunity sets, they do determine certain characteristics of 
the maximal set of any such ranking. Specifically, under the aforementioned 
conditions, a maximal element must be envy-free; however, it need not be Pareto 
efficient. Thus, our results show that these principIes entail commitment to a 
world in which no agent envies the opportunities available to another. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section contains preliminary 
definitions and notation as well as the formal description of the class of 
problems under investigation. In Section 3, we develop the basic postulates 
for the two-agent case, where they are most transparento To evaluate the 
intuitive appeal of this framework, Section 4 considers the special case in 
5This is significantly weaker than the axiom of resource monotonicity, which 
requires that all agents must benefit when aggregate resources increase and all 
agents must lose when resources decrease. [ef. Roemer (1988) and Moulin 
(990). ] 
6In this paper, we abstract from the source of opportunities, and in particular 
from the fact that sorne opportunities may be "deserved," being the result of 
one's own efforts. At this stage of our analysis, therefore, it is more 
appropriate to view this work as a generalization of exchange, in which 
endowments are exogenously specified, rather than generalizing an economy with 
production. We will address the distinction between endogenous and exogenous 
opportunities in subsequent work. 
7Notice, however, that it is consistent with this principIe that social welfare 
might increase in the event the better-off agents improve considerably and the 
worst-off only minimally; that is, the result is ambiguous and the principIe 
makes no claims in this case. Thus, asymptotically, the principIe nearly 
allows weak Pareto improvements for only the wealthy to be social welfare 
enhancing. 
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which opportunity sets are singletons in Irl-. Here the framework reduces to the 
familiar case of comparing resource aHocations. We then consider the general 
two-agent model in Section 5, and in Section 6 we extend the analysis to 
include additional agents. FinaHy, Section 7 contains concluding remarks. 
2. Preliminaries 
Let N=<l, ... ,n} be a finite set of agents, and let L be a universal set of 
opportunities. For reasons of generality, we do not specify the nature of the 
elements in L. Let I?(L) denote the set of nonempty subsets of L. We consider 
a partiaHy ordered set Ue,::5 ), where !f. is a nonempty subset of lP(L).8 ':J 
o 
denotes the order topology on !f.. 
Agent i's opportunity set is denoted de!f.. We assume each agent has 
preferences ;RI defined over the elements in !f.. 91 and <pI denote the symmetric 
and asymmetric components of ;R1, respectively. 
For S~N, let !f.s:= X !f., with generic element 05. When referring to the 
les 
entire set of agents, we omit "N" and write O in place of ON. We refer to O as 
a profHe. For Oe!f.n, let 1T (O) denote the profile obtained by transposing the 
1] 
.th d .th 
1 an J components. AIso, we define the worst-off agents at O by 
nFor Oe!f. and for SS;N, we will sayO' se!f.s is a rank-preserving improvement of 
OS if O,I<pld for aH ieS, and for aH i,jeN, oJ;RJd implies OJ;RJO' l. Let 
RP(Os) denote the set of rank-preserving improvements of 05. 
A social evaluation rule is a binary relation :t defined on !f.n. We write 
O~O' in place of (0,0' )e~ O~O' means social welfare at O is unambiguously at 
8We use::5 and ~ interchangeably.
o o 
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least as great as at O'. In the sequel, we wish to study the properties of ~ 
First, however, we identify the class of problems under consideration. 
2.1. Assumptions on ue,~ )
o 
9We impose the following restrictions on ue,~ ):
o 
(A.ll f is a continuum with respect to 
-
<.
, Le., for all A,Bef. if A < B. then 
o o 
there exists Cef such that A <C < B. 
o o 
(A.2) ~ contains the set inclusion relation S;;; in particular, < contains c. 
o o 
The class of partially ordered sets satisfying (A.ll and (A.2) includes 
"economic" domains in which the elements of f are singletons consisting of 
iinfinitely divisible commodity vectors in lR and ~ is the standard vector 
iinequality, and in which f consists of subsets of lR partially ordered by S;;. 
2.2. Assumptions on 'R 1 
We restrict our attention to 'R 1 that satisfy the following: 
Domain ('R-DOM): 'R i is complete, reflexive and transitive. 
Monotonicity ('R-MON): For all A,Bef, if A > B, then Al' lB. Also. 
o 
l9Among our notational conventions. we denote vector inequalities in IR by iit. >, 
and » with the usual interpretations. Also, for an arbitrary relation R (with 
components P and I) defined on a domain 'lJ, we define the minimal and maximal 
sets as min(R;'lJ):={de'lJ I there is no d' e'lJ such that dPd'} and max(R;'lJ):={de'lJ I 
there is no d' e'lJ such that d' Pd}. 
5 
I IContinuity (:R-CONT): For all Ae!e, the sets {A' e!e IA':R A} and {A' e!e IA:R A'} are 
el osed in 'J. 
2.3. Assumptions on ~ 
We assume ~ satisfies the following restrictions: 
Domain (~-DOM): ~ is reflexive, transitive, and ~n-complete. That is, it is 
o 
complete with respect to all pairs 0,0' e!en ordered by the partial order on 
!en induced by i!: . 
o 
Continuity (~-CONT): For all Oe!en , {O' e!en IO' ~ O} and {O' e~ IO ~ O'} are elosed 
in the product topology on !en. 
3. A normative theory: the two-agent case 
Next, we specify four normative principIes for a social evaluation rule. 
While many would argue for stronger conditions, we consider these to be minimal 
requirements. For clarity, we begin with the case in which n=2. 
10In other words, a i!: -smallest element of !e is not strictly preferred to any
o 
other elemento 
llFor example, in econornic dornains in which preferences over consumption bundles 
in IR: are rnonotonic with respect to :5, oelR: is not strictly preferred to any 
e
other bundle. Or if !e consists of subsets of lR partially ordered by S=, then a 
singleton cannot be strictly preferred to another set on the basis of size 
only. However, if:5 is a strict superset of S=, then it is consistent with 
o 
:R-MON for {x}l' i A, for sorne Ae!e. 
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PrincipIe of Just Enhancement (JE): For aH Oef2, if ai;RIOJ and OI;RJOJ, for 
i~j, then for aH O,JeRp(O\ (ai,O,J) > (ai,OJ).12 
PrincipIe of Transposition (T): For aH Oef2 , if 02;RI0 l and d;R20 2, with
 
strict preference for at least one agent, then (02,d) > (ai,02).
 
2.112 221Restricted Pareto PrincipIe (PP): For aH Oef , lf O ;R O and O ;R O , then for 
aH O' ef2 such that O) O,I;Rld and 0,2;R20 2, with strict preference for at 
least one agent, and (2) O' I;RI0 , 2 and O' 2;R20 , 1, O' > O. 
PrincipIe of Just Distribution (JD): For aH Oef2, if ai;RIOJ and ai1!JOJ, for 
i~ j, then for aH O' ef2 in which O' ~ O, if O' 11!lai, then O' J1!JOJ. 
JE is a subrestriction of the Pareto criterion. It identifies a c1ass of 
Pareto improvements which would unambiguously increase social welfare without 
posing a conflict with other evaluative criteria. SpecificaHy, it requires 
that if one agent's opportunity set is judged unanimously to be better than the 
other agent's, then a rank-preserving improvement of the latter should increase 
social welfare. 
T is straightforward; moreover, it, too, is a subrestriction of the Pareto 
criterion. 
PP identifies a further c1ass of social welfare enhancing Pareto 
improvements. It applies when each agent prefers his or her own opportunity 
set to that of the other agent and when that is the case for the Pareto 
improvement as wel1. In this way, it identifies Pareto improvements that are 
12Note that if dJiOJ, then there may be no rank-preserving expansion of ojo 
7 
not too skewed in favor of either agent. 
Final1y, like JE, JD applies when one agent's opportunity set is judged 
unanimously to be better than the other agent' s. It states that a necessary 
condition for social welfare to unambiguously increase when the welfare of the 
"rich" agent improves is that the "poor" agent should be better-off as -wel1, 
however minimal1y. This rules out social welfare improvements in which the 
"rich" get richer and the "poor" get poorer, or in which the rich get richer at 
the expense of the poor. 
4. Domain of singletons 
To evaluate the intuitive appeal of the above criteria, we consider the case 
1in which !f. consists of singleton opportunity sets of the form {x}, where xeIR , 
1
and ~ is the standard vector inequality ~ on IR . Here, the problem of ranking
o 
profiles of opportunity sets reduces to the familiar case of comparing resource 
allocations. 
Thus, consider apure exchange economy in which fixed quantities of l 
l
commodities are to be al10cated between two agents. Let QeIR++ denote the 
aggregate endowment. Agent i, i=1,2, is described by his or her consumption 
l l /1
set Xl, and again we denote preferences by 'R 1• Now, however, we write x 'R x 
1 I 1 . 1 I 1instead of {x }'R {x' }, and we cons1der 'R ~X xX. For simplicity, we take 
1 1X =IR . 
+ 
1 2 1 2 1 2Let X=X xX . An al1ocation x=(x ,x )eX is feasibLe if x +x =Q,13 and it is 
'f 1",1 j f .. 1 2 envy-f ree 1 x "'" x or l,J= , . Let Z denote the feasible set, and let F 
denote the set of envy-free al1ocations. xeZ is Pareto efficient if there is 
12 111 222 .. 
no X' =(x' ,x' )eZ such that x' 'R x and x' 'R x w1th stnct preference for at 
13Note that we consider the case without disposability. 
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least one agent. We denote the efficient set by P and the intersection of F 
and P by FP'. 
We are interested in the properties of a social evaluation rule ~ that 
s 
satisfies our normative principIes. Analogous to 'J{I, we adapt our notation and 
write ;t S;;XxX. and we modify JE. T, PP and JD accordingly. For completeness, we 
s 
inc1ude the modifications. 
JEs : For all x=(x1,x2)eX, if XI'J{iXJ and xl'J{JxJ, for i~j, then for aH 
x,JeRP(xJ), (xl,x,J» (xl,xJ).14 
s 
TS '. F 11 (1 2) X 'f 2m 1 1 d 1m 2 2 . h' f for a x= x ,x e ,1 x.n X an x.n X ,W1t stnct pre erence or at 
2 1 1 2least one agent, then (x ,x » (x ,x ). 
s 
Spp : For all x=(x1,x2)eX, if X1'J{1X2 and x2'J{2x1, then for aH x' =(x' 1,X' 2)eX 
such that O) X,1'J{1X1 and x,2'J{2X2, with strict preference for at least one 
1 1 2 2 2 1
agent, and (2) x' 'J{ x' and x' 'J{ x' , x' > x. 
s 
TSRemark. As defined, the social evaluation rule ~ and the principIes JEs , , 
s 
ppS and JDs permit comparisons among infeasible allocations. Nevertheless, we 
are interested in maximal elements in Z, as defined below. 
First, we note the logical independence of the axioms. 
14The modification, RP(x\ is defined in the obvious fashion. 
9 
s sTHEOREM 1. JE • TS • pp and JDs are logically independent. 
Proof. Obvious. 
LEMMA 2. max(~ ;Z)~". 
s 
Proof. See Border (1985), Theorem 7.12. 
sTSTHEOREM 2. If ~ satisfies JEs • and JD • then max(~ ;Z)S;F. That is. a 
s s 
15 
necessary condition for a social optimum is that it be envy-free. 
sProof. Let ~ satisfy JE • TS and JOs. and consider xeZ such that xfF. First. 
s 
.211 122lf X 'R x and x 'R x , with strict preference for at least one agent. then by 
S 2 1 2 1T , (x ,x » x. Since (x .x )eZ, xfmax(~ ;Z). 
s s 
2 1 1 2 2 1Next, without loss of generality (wlog), suppose x <P x and x <P x. (The 
15Notice that pps is not needed for Theorem 2. This calls for a brief 
discussion of the logical structure of our arguments. 
First, in advocating minimal standards for a social evaluation rule, the 
fewer the restrictions, the more encompassing the resulto in particular. for a 
"positive" result such as Theorem 2, of the form H ,... ,H imply e. In fact,
1 n 
our generalizations of Theorem 2 in Sections 5 and 6 require even fewer 
restrictions in that JE is no longer needed. (The precise role of JE is 
discussed below.) 
Conversely, for a "negative" result of the form H .....H do not imply e, a 
1 n-­
large number of (logically consistent) hypotheses is a better indicator of the 
severity. or the full extent of the restrictions necessary to ensure that C 
does hold. 
Subsequently, we discuss such a negative result vis-a-vis Pareto efficiency. 
Since the Restricted Pareto PrincipIe seems unobjectionable. including it among 
the restrictions yields a stronger resulto 
10 
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I I 
By 1(-MON and 1(-CONT. we can find celR such that x2~IXI and x2~2xl, where 
++ c c c C 
l l l l 2 2 2 2 2X :=(X +c.X •... •X n) and x :=(x -c,x •...• x n). And providing C:5XI,C l 2 <- c l 2 <­
l 2
X =(X .X )eZ. By 1(-MON. l~l l and since x2~2XI. Xl eRP(xl ). Therefore. byXc x. c c c
 
s l 2 16
 
c c c 
JE , x > (x ,x ).
c s C 
l 2 l 2Since ;::. is ~-complete by ;::'-DOM. and since x~(x.x ), x and (x ,x) are 
s c c 
;::'-comparable. By the transitivity of 1(1, x2~IXI and X2~2xl. And by 1(-MON. 
c c 
x2~2x2. Hence, by JDs , it must be the case that (XI,X 2 » x. It then follows 
C C s 
from the transitivity of ~ that x > x. Thus, xfmax(;::' ;Z)' I 
s C s s 
s s s sNext, one might enquire whether JE , T • JD , and even PP ensure that a 
social optimum is necessarily Pareto efficient, Le., that max(;::' ;Z)S;P. First, 
s 
however, we note a related consequence of the theorem. In the proof, 
l 2 l Z(x ,x » x, and yet x weakly Pareto dominates (x ,x). Hence, we have the 
C s C 
following: 
COROLLARY: Under the conditions of Theorem 2, there may exist weak Pareto 
improvements that reduce social welfare. 
Returning to the relationship between max(~ ¡Z) and P, in light of Theorem 
s 
2, one might ask whether max(~ ;Z)S;FP? 
s 
From Goldman and Sussangkarn (978), we know that generally there exist 
envy-free allocations which are inefficient and yet all Pareto improvements 
. d 17mtro uce envy. Let xeF denote such an allocation. Then to conclude that 
16For future reference, note the role played by JEs : it (together with the 
transitivity of ~) serves only to ensure that there is a feasible improvement 
for the case in which commodities are not freely disposable. 
17Earlier, Kolm (972) and Feldman and Kirman (974) showed that there are 
inefficient envy-free allocations from which a competitive equilibrium 
11 
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-max(~ ;Z)~FP requires that there exist xeZ such that x> x. Clearly, the 
s s 
conditions JEs, TS , pps and JDs do not ensure that such an x exists. 18 In fact, 
in comparing any allocation to X, the hypotheses of each of the four conditions 
fail to be satisfied. Thus, the conditions do not apply, and no conclusions 
whatsoever can be drawn. 
5. General two-agent results 
In this section we generalize the results of Section 6 to the domain of 
two-agent opportunity set rankings. We begin by generalizing the appropriate 
definitions. (For later reference, we write the definitions for the case of n 
agents. ) 
First, we will say Oe¡en is envy-free if d;RIOJ for all i,jeN. Let '!Jn denote 
the set of envy-free profiles. Next, Oe¡en is Pareto efficient, or simply 
efficient, if there does not exist O' e¡en that Pareto dominates it. Let <P 
denote the set of efficient profiles. We denote the intersection of '!J and <P by 
Returning to the two-agent case, we first note that ~-DOM and ~-CONT are 
sufficient to ensure the existence of maximal profiles in the event ¡e2 is 
compacto 
LEMMA 2. If ¡e2 is compact, then max(lt;¡e2):¡!:0. 
introduces envy.
 
18Although they may not be inconsistent with the existence of such an x. And
 
indeed more extensive restrictions on ~ may be sufficient to ensure existence.
 
s 
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Next, we have the following analogue of Theorem 2: 
19 2 
THEOREM 3. Let !f. be compacto If ~ satisfies T and JO, then max(;::';!f. ls;;~. 
That is, a necessary condition for a socially optimal distribution of 
20
opportunity sets is that it be envy-free. 
2Proof· Let ~ satisfy T and JO, and consider Oe!f. such that OE~. First, if 
02;R1d and d;R20 2, with strict preference for at least one agent, then by T, 
. 2 1 2 2(02,dl>0. Smce (O ,O le!f. , OEmax(;::';!f. ). 
Next, wlog, suppose 0 21'10 1, for i=l,2. Then by ;R-MON, since 0 21'10 1, 
02Emin(:s j!f.l. Therefore, since !f. is a continuum and since ;RI is continuous, 
o 
2 2there exists 02e !f. sueh that 0 < 0 and 021'ld, for both i. Since ~ is 
e e o e 
2:: n-complete, we then have (O1,02 l>0 by JD. Thus, OEmax(;::';!f. 2 l. Io e 
The following are two examples satisfying the aboye restrictions: 
tExampLe 7.1. Let L be a compact and connected subset of IR Then let !f. 
+ 
consist of the Lebesgue measurable subsets of L and let:s be the set inclusion 
o 
relation S;;. 
tExampLe 7.2. Let pelR++ and let KelR, K>O. Then let !f. consist of all sets of 
19We assume !f. is compact only to ensure max(;::';!f.2l~IZl, but it is not needed for 
the resulto 
20The domain in Theorem 3 differs from that of Theorem 2 in the obvious way that 
it includes more general profiles of opportunity sets. But also it is 
2
rectangular (!f. =!f.x!f.1. It is for this reason that JE is no longer necessary. 
Note also that the proof of Theorem 2 can be modified precisely as in the proof 
of Theorem 3 to allow for the case in which commodities are freely disposable. 
13 
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the form {xelREIp' x:sk} where O:sk:sK. and again Iet:s be the set inclusion 
+ o 
relation. 
6. Multilateral extension 
In this section. we extend the results in Section 5 to the fulIy general 
case involving an arbitrary number of agents. We begin by generalizing the 
normative principIes. 
JEn : For al! Oe.cen • for al! ieW(O). and for al! O,leRp(O\ (0,1. 0 -1) > 
(d,o-\ 21 
o' 1~ld for al! ieN, with strict preference for sorne i. and (2) O' I~IO' J for 
al! i,jeN, O' > O. 
nJDn: For al! 0.0' e.ce , and for al! jeW(O). if O' ~ O and if 0,11'101 for sorne 
itW(O), then O' J1'JOJ. 
THEOREM 4. Let.ce be compacto If ~ satisfies ~ and JDn. then max(~~)Ii1's;~.
 
Le.• any social!y optimaI distribution that is Pareto efficient must be
 
envy-free as well.
 
Proa!. Let ~ satisfy ~ and JDn, and consider Oe.cen such that Ot~. First, if 
2I_i denotes N\{i}. 
14 
'11 ----------­
1i 
:1 
oJ:R1d and d:RJoJ,	 for sorne i,jeN, with strict preference for at least one of 
n
the two, then by T , 1l (0»0. Therefore, OEmax(~f"I) and, hence, 
. lJ 
OEmax(~ln)nep. 
Next, suppose oJep1d and oJepJd for sorne i,jeN, and suppose also that Oeep. 
We must show that OEmax(~ln). 
Wlog let i=1 and j=2 so that 02ep1d and 02ep2d. Adapting the argument in 
Varian (974), Theorem 2.1, since Oeep, W(O)~C2l. That is, at O, there is at 
least one agent k such that d:R10k for aH ieN.22 Clearly, 2EW(0). Moreover, 
by :R-MON, 02Emin(::$ ;l)' Since 1 is a continuum and ;Rl is continuous, there 
o 
2
exists 02el such that 0 2 < 0 and 02ep2d. Therefore, since ~ is ~n-complete, 
e e o e o 
we have (02,0-2»0 by JD. Thus, OEmax(~f"I). I 
e 
7. Conclusion 
Our objective in this paper has been two-fold: first, to cast the discussion 
of social welfare evaluation in terms of the distribution of opportunities, 
and, second, to search for common ground among possibly competing views of 
appropriate evaluative criteria. Regarding the first, We have extended our 
earlier work in several directions. 
In Kranich 0993a), we considered finite opportunity sets, and we abstracted 
from the preferences of the agents. There, our objective was to demonstrate 
that the axiomatic approach is capable of rendering a complete ranking of 
profiles of opportunity sets on the basis of fairness. In Kranich 0993b), we 
again addressed the question of equitable opportunities, and we again required 
220therwise, if for aH i there exists j such that OlepJOJ, then since N is 
finite there must exist a cycle of envy among the agents. Transposing the 
opportunity sets appropriately would yield a Pareto improvement. 
15 
that a social evaluation rule be complete, although we extended the analysis to 
include connected economic domains in rr/-. Moreover, we incorporated sorne 
general information about agents' preferences (in particular, that they are 
monotonicl, but we again abstracted from the specific relations. 
In the present paper, we no longer address the question of equity per se. 
Indeed, this represents one of the "competing views" we attempt to reconcile. 
Since our analysis is independent of the overaU objective, it is not 
surprising that we forego the requirement of completeness. In return, the 
present analysis fuUy incorporates agents' preferences and it pertains to a 
larger class of problems. 
Regarding our second objective, we have shown that under minimal 
rest rIctlOns, SOCIa op Ima must e envy- ree. us, w atever stronger· . . 1 t' b f 23 Th h 
conditions one might wish to impose on a social evaluation rule, they must be 
consistent with the envy-free criterion. In other words, we might limit our 
search for welfare optima to the envy-free seto 
The practical limitation of the present analysis, as discussed in footnote 
6, is that it is appropriately viewed as an extension of exchange environments 
in which opportunity sets are specified exogenously. In our subsequent work, 
we wiU extend the analysis to include endogenously determined opportunity 
sets. Nevertheless, within the framework developed here, our results show 
that, regardless of one's larger views of social welfare, accepting the 
aforementioned principIes requires commitment to a world in which aU agents 
have equitable opportunities. 
230ur use of the term "minimal" was explained in footnote 4. 
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